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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a
corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
CENTRAL WEBER SEWER 11\IPROVEMENT DISTRIC1', a municipal corporation; LYMAN .M. HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN, ELl\IER CARVER, constituting
the Board of County Commissioners of
Weber County, a municipal corporation;
and LYl\IAN ~I. HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN and ELl\LmR CARVER, County
Commissioners of Weher County, a muniripal corporation,
Appellants.

Case No.

8171

THE ~IOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COl\fPANY,
a corporation,
Respondent,
VR.

CENTRAL WEBER SEWER IJ\lPROVE~fENT DISTRICT, a municipal corporation; LYMAN ~I. HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN, ELMER CARVER, constituting
the Board of County Commissioners of
Weher County, a municipal corporation;
and LYMAN M. HESS, ARTHUR P.
RRO\VX and EL:\fER CARVER, County

Case No.

8172
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Cmnmissioners of Weber County, a Inunicipal corporation,
Appellants.
UTAH POWEH & LIGHT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
CENTRAL WEBER SEvVER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, a 1nunicipal corporation; LY~IAN ~I. HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN and ELl\IER CARVER, constituting the Board of County Cmnmisioners
of Weber County, a 1nunicipal corporation,
Appellants.

Case No.

8173

BA~IBERGER

RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and BA1fBERGER
TRANSPORTATION COl\IPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Respondents,
vs.
CENTRAL WEBER REWER Il\IPROVEMENT DISTRIC1\ a municipal corporation; LYMAN I\1. HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN, ELl\IER CARVER, constituting
the Board of County Commissioners of
Weber Count~?. a 1nunicipal corporation;
and LYMAN l\L HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN and ELl\fER CARVER, County
Commissioners of Weber County, a municipal corporation,
Appellants.

Case No.

8174

2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SOUTHERN
PACIFIC
COMPANY,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COJ\1:p ANY, OREGON f.iHORrr LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, and THE OGDEN
UNION RAILWAY AND DEPOT COl\;IPANY,
Respondents,

Case No.

VR.

8175

BOARD OF COlTNTY COl\f?\riSSIONER.S
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, CONSISTING OF LY1\£AN ?\L
HESS, ARTHUR P. BROWN and ELMER
CARVER, and the CENTRAL WEBER
SEWER Il\IPROVEl\;[ENT DISTRICT,
Appellants.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
CENTRAL WEBER REWER Il\IPROVE::\[ENT DISTRICT, a municipal corporation; LYMAN J\L HESS, ARTffiJR P.
BRO"\VN, EL,fER CARVER, constituting
the Board of County Com1nissioners of
Weber County, a municipal corporation;
and L Yl\[AN ?\L HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN and ELl\;fER CARVER, County
Commissioners of Weher County, a munieipal corporation.
Appellants.

Case No.

8176
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STATE~fENT

OF FACTR

This is an appeal frmn the Judg1nents of the lower
court in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant~
in the above-entitled cases eli1ninating and excluding
from Central Weber Sewer I1nprove1nent District rrrtain properties located within the District. Upon stipulation of counsel this Court ordered all t hr casrs consolidated for purposes of appeal.
Briefly the facts are as follows: On or about ~larch
3, 1953, the Board of County Comn1issioners of Weber
County adopted a resolution creating the Sewer District
and defined the boundaries of the District. The resolution was as follows:
""RESOLUTION
"WHEREAS. pursuant to authority made and provided in Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, as mnenderl
by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah, 1951, the Board of ComInissioners of Weber County, Utah, has resolved that
the public health, convenience, and necessity require
the creation of a sewer i1nprovement distrirt for the
area hereinafter described, anrl
""WHEREAS; the Board of Com1nissioners of Weber
County has given notice of its intention to establish
such a district, which notice, in conformance with the
laws of the State of Utah, was duly published in the
Ogden Standard-Examiner newspaper, a paper of general circulation in Weber County, once each week for
five successive weeks, and
"WHEREAS, in said notice a time and place were
designed (sic) at which all interested parties could ap4
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pear before said Board of County Commissioners and be
heard in support of or in opposition to the creation of
~aid district, and
"WHER:illAS, said hearing was had by the Board
of Commissioners of WehPr County on the 25th day
of February, 1953, at the time and place designated in
said notice, and all written protests that had been filed
as required by law and all that were presented up to
the adjournment of said hearing being received, and.
there having been eleven protests in all presented in
opposition to the establishment of the district, and
''WHEREAS, the officials who prepared the last
a~f-'essment roll for Weber County segregated and
rertified to this Board the assessed valuation of the
real propPrty appearing on the roll which lies within
the proposed houndariPs of this district, and it being
clear that the protests filed represent far less than
25% of the assessed valuation of the real property in the
distriet, and that the written protests filed are signed
h~· far less than 25% in number of the real property
owners \vithin the proposed district, according to the
last assessment roll for rounty taxes cornpleted prior
to the publishing of the notir<> of hearing, and
"WHER~JAS, the Weher County SurvPyor has
checked and reported that the boundaries of the propose<l distriet are aecurate as sPt forth below and in
the notice of hearing, and it appearing to the Board
that all property· originally included in the proposed
district, as set out in the notice of intention to establish
the district, will he dirPdly benefited h~· the proposed
improvements and should hP included within said district, and
5
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"WHEREAS, it appears to the Board of Commissioners of Weber County that this district should he
established immediately under the na1ne of tlH• Central
W eher Sewer In1prove1nent District,
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT, AND IT HEREBY
IS RESOLVED by the Board of Cmn1nissioners of
Weher County, Utah, as follows:
"1. That a sewer improvmnent district, to be kno\vn
and identified as the 'Central Weber Sewer ImproveInent District', shall he, and it is hereh~· rstahlislwd
and rrea ted.

"2. That the boundaries of said distrirt are definr(l
as follows, and all area and property lying within
these described bounds is now within and henceforth
a part of this sewer district:
(Here follows a description hy rnetes and
bounds of the area encompassed within the District.)
"3. That at the hearing held hy the Board of Comnlissioners of Weber County on the 25th day of February, 1953, at the time and place designated in the
notice published in confor1nance with the laws of the
State of Utah, setting- forth the intention to establish
a sewer district, only eleven protests by number against
the establishment of said sewer district were filed with
the County Clerk and received hy the Board of ComInissioners of Weber County, and it is hereby determined that the protests filed and presented represent
far less than 25% of the assessed valuation of the real
property in the district, and the said protests are signed
hy far less than 25% in number of the real property
6
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owners within the proposed district, according to the
last assessment roll for county taxes completed prior
to the publication of the notice of hearing.
"4. That the boundaries of the proposed district,
as set forth above, are accurate and that all property
originally included in the proposed district, as set out
in the notice of intention to establish the district, it
being the same property as described above, will be
directly benefited by the proposed improvements, and
all of this property should be included within said
district and none should be eliminated.
";). rrhat it appears that the Board of Trustees of
this improvement district should be comprised of approximately seven members, and it is recommended by
the Board of Commissioners of Weber County that if
the n1e1nhers of the Board of Trustees were appointed
in the following manner, it would 1nake an excellent
working organization: One each to he designated and
appointed h:' the ::\la~·01, with the consent and approval
of the governing body of the municipalities of the City
of ~ orth Ogden, the City of South Ogden, and the City
of Riverdale, and two each to be designated and appointed l>y the Chairman of the County Commission
and the ~iayor of Ogden City, with the consent and
approval of the governing bodies of said Ogden City
and Weber ( ount~·.
"6. That the public health and safety make it
mandatory that this resolution become effective immediately upen signing.
''RESOLVED, ()RDERED AND ADOPTED by the
Board of Commissioners of Weber County, State of
lTtah, this 3rd day of Marel1, l~l:l:--1.
1

7
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Cmnmissioner Lyn1an l\L Hess voting ay<'
Commissioner Arthur P. Brown voting ay<'
Commissioner Ehner Carver voting aye
/s/ Lyman M. Hess
Ly1nan l\[. Hess, Chainnan of the
Board of County Commissioners
of vVelwr County, State of Utah.
"ATTEST:
/s/ Lawrence l\I. l\Ialan
Lawrence l\L Malan
Weber County Clerk
"STATE OF UTAH } ss.
County of Weber
"I, LAWRENCE ~L l\IALAN, County Clerk and
Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board of County Com1nissioners
of Weber County, State of Utah, do hereby c·ertify that
the above and foregoing resolution was passed hy the
Board of County Commissioners of said County at the
regular meeting held l\Iarch 3, 1953 ; I further certify
that upon passing of the resolution, Commissioners
Hess, Brown, and Carver voted aye.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand
and official seal at my office in the County of Weber,
State of Utah, this lOth day of :March, 1953.
(SEAL)
/s/ Lawrence l\I. :Malan
Lawrence M. l\falan
County Clerk and Ex-Officio Clerk
of the Board of Commission·ers
of Weber Count~·." (Italics ours.)
8
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All the area and property lying within the described
boundaries were declared to be a part of the District.
Prior to the adoption of said resolution, each of the
respondents herein filed a protest and petition with
the Board of Commissioners alleging that certain of
the property, real and personal, classified for assessment purposes h.v the State Tax Commission of Utah
would not be directly benefited in any manner by the
establishment of the District. A hearing was had hy
the Board of Count:· Commissioners on February 25,
1953, after notice duly published, for the consideration
of protests; and after consideration of the protests the
Board found that all the property should be included
within said District and none ~houlcl he eliminated.
rrhe District was created pursuant to Chapter 24,
Laws of Utah 1949, as amended by Chapter 32, Laws
of Utah, 1951.
Thereafter each of the respondents filed a complaint and petition for review in the District Court of
Weber County, and Writs of Review were duly issued
hy the Court. The complaints and petitions did not
attack the regularit:· of the proceedings of the Board
of County Cmmnissioners. Appellants filed Motions
to Dismiss (or if said l\[otions were denied) Demands
for l\[ore Definite Statement and ::\lotions to Strike. The
~Lotions were denied hy the Court.
Appellants then
filed their Answers and issue was joined thereon. Prior
to the trial, appellants filed Motions for Judgment on
the Pleadings whif·h J\1 otions were also denied by the
Court. ( ~ounsel for the respective parties in each case
then stipulated in writing certain facts which were made
9
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a part of the record in each case, subject to appellants'
reservation of objections as hereinafter appears in the
stipulation. Upon the case being called for trial before
the Court without a jury, objection was made hy appellants to the introduction of any evidence, and objection
was made to the introduction of any evidence included
within the stipulation of fact~. The Court reserved
ruling on those objections pending the filing of briefs
and the oral argu1nents of counsel. The cases were
then submitted to the Court for decision based solely
upon said stipulations, the exhibits and the records. No
other testilnony was offered or received by the Cou:r:t.
Written briefs were filed by each of the parties and
the matter argued.
On or about the 27th day of February, 1954, the
Court entered the following:
1. Order overruling objection to the introduction
of any evidence and objection to the introduction of evidence included within stipulation of
facts;
2. Order denying 1notion for judgment on the
pleadings;
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
and
4. Judgment.
The following paragraphs were offered as stipulated facts, if admissible at all, in each of the six cases,
and are common to each:
"Between counsel for the parties in the above
entitled action, it is hereby stipulated and agreed
as follows:
"1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph
numbered 2 hereof, the facts set forth in this

10
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stipulation shall he made a part of the record in
this case in all respects as though such facts
were proved by witnesses sworn and testifying
in open court.
"2. This stipulation shall be without prejudice to the right of defendants to object to
the materiality of any fact set forth in para, graphs numbers 3, 4 and 5 hereof or the relevancy
of any such fact to any issue involved in this
case, and defendants expressly reserve the right
to interpose any such objection at the time this
stipulation is offered and tendered for filing in
this case.

"* * ':.
"4. If the house journal for the Twenty-Ninth
Regular Session of the Legislature of the State
of Utah (1951 Regular Session) were introduced
in this case, such journal would show that when
senate bill No. 22 was introduced, said bill provided for the elimination from any district proposed thereunder of property originally included
therein, but which the county commissioners
should determine would not be benefited by the
proposed improvements. Said journal would
further show that said senate bill No. 22 was later
amended to provide for the elimination from any
such district of property included therein, but
1rhich the county commissioner shall determine
would not be directly benefitrrl by the prozwsed
improvements.
"5. If a witness or witnesses were called and
sworn hy the parties hereto, such witness or witnesses would testify that the nature and extent of
the i lllprovements proposed by the defendants and
respondents are the construction of a sanitary
sewer system consisting of sewage outfall lines,
11
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sewage interceptor and trunk collertion line~, sewage treatment plants and related facilities and
appurtenances for the collection, treatment and
disposition of sewage within the district.
"6. If a witness or witnesses were called hy
defendants and sworn herein, that such witness
or witnesses would testify that the creation of the
proposed district and the construction, operation
and maintenance of the sewage facilities proposed would be for the general benefit of the area
included within the lilnits of said district." (ltali<'~
ours.)
The only 1naterial differences in these stipulation~
in the various cases wer0 the descriptions of the several
properties sought to he excluded hy the several respondents and the descriptions of the properties admittedly
included within the District.
For the convenience of the Court we are setting out
below the several statements of agreed facts, if admissible at all, as they were set forth in the stipulations in
each case, to show those differences as between the claims
of the several respondents:
No. 8171. 11 he Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. case :
"3. If W. S. Speckn1an were called by plaintiff and sworn in this rase, he would testify as
follows:
"' (a) The Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Con1pany, plaintiff above named, on the
date hereof has, located within the limits of
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, or
th'ere is apportioned to said district for assessment and taxation purposes, the following property, to wit:

12
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'• ( 1) Trackage
3.69 miles first main line, including
100 foot right of way.
13.06 miles yard and industry tracks,

"(2)
" ( 3)

"( 4)

" ( 5)

" ( 6)

exclusive of any land .
.58 miles sugar works spur, exclusive
of any land.
17.95 miles of telephone, telegraph, and
transmission line~.
Rolling stock, consisting of locomotives
and cars, apportioned on a hasis of
17.33 miles.
Real estate outside right of way consisting of 48.14 acres of land.
Improvements and personal property
located upon or affixed to the land designated in the above sub-paragraph (4).
Personal property, consisting of Inarhinery and tools not located upon or
affixed to the land designated in the
above sub-paragraph (4).

·• (b) Plaintiff, The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, does not seek to have
excluded from said district said 48.14 acres of
land nor the improvements or personal property
located thereon. Plaintiff seeks to have excluded
from said district all of the other property above
described.
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, The
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad designated in sub-paragraphs numbered (1), (2), (3)
and (6) and sought to be excluded from said district in this action is presently physically connected to any sewage facilitie~, and 1n the con-

13
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duct of plaintiff's railroad operations, it is not
desirable or feasible to make a physical connection of any such property to any sewage facilities.
In the ordinary and regular operation of the
railroad transportation business the rights of
way, rolling stock and other equipment are used
in connection and in conjunction with the property which plaintiff concedes 1nay ren1ain within
the district."
No. 8172. The l\fountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Co. case:
"3. If W. H. Morton were called hy plaintiff
and sworn in this case, he would testify as follows:
"(a) The Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company, plaintiff above named, on
the date hereof has, located within the lilnits of
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, or
there is apportioned to said district for assessment and taxation purposes, the following property, to wit:
" ( 1) 6224 telephone poles.
"(2)
18 miles of copper wire.
616 miles of iron wire.
"(3) 943,766 feet of cable.
172.707 feet of single duct conduit.
" ( 4) 3 parcels of land and buildings thereon.
" ( 5) personal property, consisting of switchboards, materials and supplies, furniture and fixtures, and toll terminal
equipment, located within the buildings
on the premises designated in sub-paragraph ( 4) above.
"(6) Personal property, consisting of private
branch exchange equipment, teletype-

14
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writers, tools and work equipment and
1nobile radio telephone equipment located outside the buildings on the premises designated in sub-paragraph ( 4)
above.
"(b) Plaintiff, The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company does not seek to
have excluded from said district said three parcels
of land and the buildings thereon. Plaintiff seeks
to have excluded from said district all of the
other property above described.
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, Tlw
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company designated in sub-paragraphs numbered (1),
(2), (3), (5) and (6) and sought to be excluderl
from said rlistrict in this action is presently
physically connected to any sewage facilities, and
in the conduct of plaintiff's telephone operations,
it is not desirable or feasible to make a physieal
connection of any such property to any sewage
facilities. In the ordinary and regular operation
of the telephone communication business the poles,
wires, cables, switchboards and other equipment
are used in connection and in conjunetion with the
property which plaintiff concedes may remain in
the district. The property in sub-paragraph ( 5)
described is located within buildings, which buildings are present]~· eonnerterl with sewage facilities."
Xo. 817:1. Utah Power & Light Co. Case:
"3. If 0 ..J. Lowe were called by plaintiff and
sworn in this case, he would testify as follows:
"(a) 'rhe 1Ttah Power & Light Company,
plaintiff a hove named, on the date hereof, has
located within the limits of Central W'eber Sewer
Improvement Distriet the fo1lowing property, the

15
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inclusion of which in said District jt haR prote~tr•l
and now protests, as classified for assess1nent anrl
taxation purposes:
" ( 1) Transmission lines
Poles and pole structures, together with
crossarms, insulators, attachn1ents and
appurtenances, sectionalizing switchracks and overhead conductors and devices carrying voltage of 44,000 volts and
over, and the easements therefor.
"(2) Distribution lines
Poles and pole structures, crossarms, insulators, attachments, appurtenances,
transformers, protective equipment such
as lightning arresters and grounding
devices, and overhead conductors and
devices such as switches, voltage regulators, capacitors and cutouts carrying
voltage under 44,000 volts, and the easeInents therefor.
"(3) Substation improvements and equipment
Supporting structures, buses, switches
(manual and motor operated), protective, control and measuring equipment,
insulators, appurtenant attachments,
transformers and other recognized substation equipment.
" ( 4) Power plant equipment and improvements
Electric generating equipment consisting of turbines, generators, buses,
switches (manual and motor operated),
control equipment, protective equipment and communication equipment.

16
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" ( 5) Telephone lines
Poles and pole structures, crossarms,
insulators, attachments, appurtenances,
and conductors for voice and signa]
transmission, and the ease1nents therefor.
"(b) None of the property of plaintiff, Utah
Power & Light Company, designated in sub-paragraphs numbered 1 to 5, inclusive, and sought to
he excluded from said District in this action, is
presently physically connected to any sewage
facility, except that s01ne of the property described in sub-paragraph ( 4) above is located in
buildings which have toilet installations and in
the conduct of plaintiff's operations it i~ not
desirable or feasible to make a physical connection of any such property to any sewage facilities.
rehat in the ordinary and regular operation of
plaintiff's business, the transmission and distribution lines, substations and other equipment described herein are used in connection and in conjunction with the property which plaintiff concedes may remain in the District.
''7. That the picture attached hereto, 1narked
Exhibit 1 and entitled 'Roy-Riverdale 130 kv
reaps', shows a part of a typical transmission line
such as plaintiff seeks to exclude from the Central
Weber Sewer Improvement District; that tlw
picture attached hereto, marked Exhibit 2 and entitled 'Typical12.5 kv Distribution Line on Riverdale Road', shows a part of a distribution line
typical of those plaintiff seeks to exclude from
said District; that the picture attached hereto,
marked Exhibit 3 and entitled 'South Ogden Substation,' shows a substation typical of those plaintiff seeks to Pxelude frmn said District; that the
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pictures attached hereto, marked Exhibits ..J., 5, 6,
7 and 8 and entitled 'Riverdale Plant 130 kv
Transformer Bank', 'Roy-Riverdale 130 kv LinP
Terminal Tower and Air Break Switches on Line
No. 1', 'Generators-Riverdale Plant', 'Generator-Pioneer Plant' and 'Switchrack-RoyRiverdale 130 kv Nos. 1 and 2 at Riverdale Plant',
show power plant equipment typical of that plaintiff seeks to exclude from the said District."
No. 8174. Bamberger Railroad Cmnpany, et al case:
"3. If H. L. Balser, were called h~· plaintiff,
Bamberger Railroad Cmnpany, and sworn in this
case, he would testify as follows:
"(a) The Bamberger Railroad Co1npany, one
of the plaintiffs above named, on the date hereof
has locatPd within the limits of ~entral Weber
Sewer Improvement District, or there is apportioned to said District for assessment and taxation purposes, the following property, to-wit:
"(1) Trackage
4.92 miles mainline and appurtenances,
including right of way varying between 66 and 100 feet in width, excepting approximately ____________ miles
located within and upon public
streets and highways.
2.30 miles yard and industry tracks, PXclusive of any land.
" ( 2) Rolling stock, consisting of locomotives
and various types of cars, apportioned
on a basis of 7.22 miles.
"(3) Real estate outside of right of way.
" ( 4) Improvements and personal property
located upon or affixed to the land designated in the above subparagraph 3.
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"(b) Plaintiff Bamberger Railroad Company
does not seek to have excluded from said District
said property designated in sub-paragraphs 3 and
4. Plaintiff Bamberger Railroad Company seeks
to have excluded from said District all of the
other property above described in subparagraphs
1 and 2.
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, Bamberger Railroad Company designated in subparagraphs 1 and 2, and sought to be excluded from
said District in this action is presently physically
connected to any sewage facilities, and in the conduct of plaintiff's railroad operations, it is not
desirable or feasible to make a physical connection
of any such property to any sewage facilities.
That in the ordinary and regular operation of the
railroad transportation business the rights of
way, rolling stock and other equipment are used
in connection and in conjunction with the property
which plaintiff concedes 1nay remain within the
District.
"4. lf Dale W. Barratt were called by plaintiff, Bamberger Transportation Company, and
sworn in this case, he would testify as follows:
" (a) That Bamberger Transportation Company, one of the plaintiffs above named, on the
date hereof has located within the limits of Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, or there
is apportioned to said District for assessment and
taxation purposes hy the State Tax Commission
of Utah, the following property, to-wit:
~[otor Coaches.
"(b) Plaintiff. Bamberger Transportation
Company seeks to have excluded from said District, all of the property above described in paragraph 4 (a)-.
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" (c) None of the property of plaintiff Bamberger Transportation Cmnpany designated in
paragraph 4 (a) and sought to be excluded from
said District in this action, is presently phyl-lirally
connected to any sewage facilities, and in the conduct of plaintiff Bamberger Transportation Company's bus transportation operation, it is not desirable or feasible to make a physical connection
of such property to any sewage facilities. That in
the regular and ordinary operation of the hul-l
transportation business the motor coaches are
used in connection and in conjunction with property which is not owned by plaintiff Bamberger
Transportation Company, but is leased by the
same, but in the opinion only of Bamberger
Transportation Company is property of a type
which might rernain within the Distrid."
No. 8173. Southern Pacific Co., et al casr:
"3. If F. B. Magruder were called by plaintiff, Southern Pacific Company, and sworn in this
case he would testify as follows:
" (a) Southern Pacific Company, plaintiff
above nmned, on the date hereof has, located within the limits of Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, or there is apportioned to said district for assessment and taxation purposes, the
following property to wit:
" ( 1) Trackage
1.216 miles first main line including
100 foot right of wa~~.
1.192 rniles second main line including
100 foot right of way.
17.226 miles yard and industrial tracks
and sidings.
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"(2) 26.978 miles telephone, telegraph and
transmission lines.
" ( 3) Rolling stock consisting of locomotiveR
and cars apportioned on a baRis of
19.634 miles.
" ( 4) Real estate outside of right of way consisting of 99.77 acres of land including
jointly owned acres.
" ( 5) Improvements and personal property
located upon or affixed to the land designated in the above subparagraph ( 4).
,. ( 6) Personal property, consisting of machinery and tools not located upon or
affixed to the land designated in tlw
above sub-paragraph ( 4). '~(b) Plaintiff, the Southern Pacific Con1pany, does not seek to have excluded from said,
district said 99.77 acres of land nor the improvements or personal property located ther'eon.
Plaintiff, Southern Pacific Company, seeks to
have excluded from said district all of the other
property above described.
" (c) None of the property of plaintiff, Southern Pacific Company, designated in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (6) and sought to be
exc-luded fron1 said district in this action is
presently physically connected to any sewage
facilities, and in the conduct of plaintiff's railroad
operations, it is not desirable or feasibl'e to make
a physical connection of any ~mch property to any
sewage facilitieR. r[,hat in the ordinary and
regular operation of the railroad transportation
busine~~ the rights of way, rolling stock and
other equipment are used in connection and in
conjunetion with the property which plaintiff
concedes may remain within the district."
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No. 8176.

~I ountain

Fuel Supply Cmnpany Case:

"3. If L. C. Peschel "'ere called hy the plaintiff and sworn in this case, he would testify as
follows:
"(a) That Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
plaintiff above nmned, on the date hereof ha~,
located within the limits of the Central Weber
Sewer Improvement Distric-t, or there is apportion'ed to said district for assess1nent and taxation
purposes, the following property, to-wit:
" ( 1) Transmission 1nains.
"(2) Cla~R I distribution properties.
"(3) Class II distrihution properties.
"( 4) Class IV distribution propertieR.
" ( 5) Real estate.
" ( 6) Improvements.
"(7) Personal property son1e of which is
located or affixed to the land designated in sub-paragraph (5) and some i~
not located or affixed to the land designated in said sub-paragraph (5 ).
"(b) That Class I distribution propertie~
are distribution properties located within said
district and within cities or towns other than the
city of Ogden, Utah. Class II distribution prop·erties are properties located within said district
in county areas outside of cities and towns. Class
IV distribution properties are distribution properties located within said distric-t within the
corporate limits of Ogden City, Utah.
"(c) That plaintiff, the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, does not seek to have eliminated
from said district the property designated in
sub-paragraphs numbered (5), (6) and (7). Plain-
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tiff does seek to have elminated hy this action
from said district all other propert~· above described.
" (d) That none of the propert~· of the plaintiff, the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, designated in sub-paragraphs numbered 3. (a) (1),
(2), (3) and ( 4) and sought to be eliminated from
said district in this action is presently physically
connected to any sewage facility, and in the conduction of plaintiff's operations it is not desirable
or feasible to make a physical connection of any
such property to any sewage facilities. That in
the ordinary and regular operation of the plaintiff's business the gas transmission mains and
gas distribution properties, consisting of gas
distribution mains, gas service lines, meters,
regulators and accessories and appurtenances
thereto and rights of way and easements therefor
which are the properties referred to above in subparagraph 3 (a) (1), (2), (3), and (4) are used
in connection and in conjunction with property
which plaintiff concedes may remain in the district.'''
NTATE~IENT

OF POINTN

This appeal is made upon the entire record in said
cause• and upon the following points:
1. Refusal of the Court to grant Defendants' l\Totion
to Dismiss.
~. Refusal of tlw Court to grant Defendants' ~[otion
to Strike.
3. Error of tl!P ( ~ourt in overruling Defendants'
Objection to the Introduction of any Evidence
and OhjPdion to Introduction of Evidence Included Within Stipulation of Facts.

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4. Error of the Court in denying Defendants' Motion
for J udg1nent on the Pleadings.
5. Error of the Court in entering Judgment in
favor of Plaintiffs-and-Petitioners and against
Defendants-and-Respondent~.

6. Insufficiency of the (\Vidence to justify the .J nrlgnlent.
7. That the .Judginent was contrary to law.
8. Errors in law.
ARGU~[ENT

Point 3: ERROR OF rrHE· COUR~r IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIO~ TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY EVIDENCE AND
OBJECTION TO INTRODU( 1 TION OF E¥IDENCE INCLUDED WITHIN STIPULATION OF FACTS.
Point 4: ERROR OF THE COUR'l., IN DENYING
DJ1JFENDANTS' :MOTION FOR .JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS.
Point 5: ERROR OF THE COURT IN ENTERING
.JUDG?\[ENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFSAND-PE1TITIONERS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS-AND-RESPONDENTS.

For clarity of argument we discuss the points set
forth in our State1nent of Points out of their numerical
sequence.
The foregoing points ( 3, 4 and 5) will be discussed
together for the rea~wn that they are so closely related.
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The question is whether the proceedings before the
lower court was a review of the record made before the
Board of County Commissioners at th'e public hearing
at the time the District was created or whether it was
a trial de novo.
Appellants contend that the proceedings in the
lower court were for review only and that th'e introduction and admission of new evidence-by stipulation
or otherwise-was error. Appellants call attention to
paragraph 2 of the stipulation which provided as follows:
··2. This stipulation shall he without prejudice to the right of defendants to object to thr
materiality of any fact set forth in paragraphs
numbered 3, 4 and 5 hereof or the relevancy of
any such fact to any issue involved in this case,
and defendants expressly reserve the right to
interpose any such objection at the time this
stipulation is offered and tendered for filing in
this case."
Appellants ohjertrd to the introduction of any
evidence and ob;jectPd to the introduction of the evidence
included within the stipulation. rrhe objections were
overruled hy the court and (based in part thereon)
judgment was entered against the appellants.
Appellants assigned this as rrror.
vVe call the Court's attention to Laws of Utah,
1951, Chapter 32, RPdion 3, which provides in part as
follows:
"* * * In such resolution establishing such District, the Board of County Commissioners shall
eliminate from said proposed District any prop-
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erty originally incorporated therein hnt which
it shall detennine will not be directly benefited
by the proposed improvements. Any property
owner who shall have fil'ed a written protr~t, as
he;reinbefore provided, and whose property has
been included, notwithstanding such protest, may
within (30) thirty days after the adoption of the
resolution establishing such District, apply to
the District Court of the Judicial District in
which such County is located for a nr rit of Re1:ieu· of the actions of the Board of Countv
Commissioners in so establishing such Distrirt,
but only upon the grounds that his property will
not be directly benefited by thr propsed improvrments. * * *" (Italics ours.)
It will he noted that specifir referenre i~ made in
the foregoing law to "Writ of Review". We call attention to Section 104-67-1, Utah Code Annotated, 194R,
which states as follow~:
"The Writ of Certiorori may be designated the
Writ of Review."
Subsequently thereto, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
were adopted to take effert .January 1, 1950; anrl Rule
65B (b) states a~ follows:
"Grounds For Relief. Appropriate relief may
be granted: * * * (2) Where an inferior tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial functions
has exceeded its jurisdictions or abused its discretion; * * * ."
Rule 65 B (e), among other things, provides as follows:
"The review by the Court issuing the Writ shall
not be extended further than to determine whether
the inferior tribunal, board, or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal,
board, or officer."
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\Vhile no formality a~ to hearing is designated, it
would appear tlJat the respondents were afforded an
opportunity to appear and be heard upon their protests. They should have introduced before the Board
of County Conm1issioners such evidence as they desired, and could have there requested that the entire
proceedings he reported. They did not do so. As a
matter of fact, they could likewise have requested that
the Board of County Commissioners stipulate the facts
in much the same manner as was done in the lower
court.
Not having made any such record, there was nothing
hefore the lower court and there is now nothing before
this court except the record of proceedings had before
the Board of County Commissioners in connection with
the creation of the District. This would seem to have
been respondents' own them·~· at the time they filed the
proceedings in the lower Court. As an example, the
prayPr of Southern Pacific Company, et al (Case No.
8175), reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, applicants pray that this
court issue its Writ of Review directed to said
defendants, and each of them, requiring said
defendants, within the time specified in said
Writ, to prepare and certify to this court a complete record of all proceedings had in connection
with the creation of said District; that upon the
return of said Writ, with said record duly certified and the proceedings had herein, a judgment
and decree he entered * * * ."
It occurs to us that that prayer contemplates what
the Jaw eontPmplatPs, simply a review of whatever
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record waH 1nade before tlw Board of County Cmnmissioners. We do not see anywhere in it a request for
a trial de novo. The trial de novo semns to have been
an afterthought of respondents since the filing of thr
protests and since the cmnmence1nent of these actions.
We submit that paragraph 4 of the resolution passed
by the Board of County Cmnmissioners as set out
herein is a finding which the County Commissioner~"
made and is legally sufficient. The case of
Tygesen v. Magna Water Works Co. 266 P. 2rl127
holds that there is no distinction between the creation
of a Metropolitan Water District in the District Court
and the creation of an In1provement District by the
County CmnmissionerH. Both were the agencies designated hy the legislature through which thf' Districts
could be created. lt was pointed out that once the
initiating agency had acted, its functions ceased and thr
governing body of the District assmned control. We see
no distinction between the action of the court on the
one hand and the Board of County Commissioners on
the other, as it related to the formality of creating the
District. Both, in performing the duties outlined by
law, were performing judicial functions in creating said
Districts in each instance. We believe that respondents
are entitled to a review of the actions of the Board of
County Commissioners, hut that the review should be
limited to the recerd 1nade before that Board and only
to determine "whether the Board has regularly pursued
the authority of such board."
It was held in the case of Higgs vs. Burton, 197 P.
728 that:
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"The courts are entirelv unanimous in holding
that in certiorari proce~dings, the records certified up, by the court, board, or tribunal to whom
it is directed, i1nports absolute verity, and cannot be contradicted or supported hy evidenc<'
dehors the record."
That the requirement of due process of law is met,
is fully answered in
Tygesen v. 2\[agna Water Works Co., supra,
beginning with headnote (11) page 132.
On the state of the record before it, the lower Court
had no evidence upon which it could do otherwise than
affirm and uphold the ac-tions of the Board of County
Commissioners; and hence it was error for the lower
Court to deny appellants' ::\lotions for Judgment on the
Pleadings and to enter judgn1ents in favor of the respondents and against the appellants.
Po~t

1: REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS' ;\lOTION TO DISMISS.

Point 6: INSUF,FICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO
.JUSTIFY THE JUDG1\IENT.
Point 7: THAT THE .JUDGl\lENT WAS CONTRARY
TO LAW.
Point 8: ERROR~ IN LAW.
The legislative enactn1ent under consideration provides for the creation of sewer i1nprovement "districts".
One of the first things to detPrmine, then, is:
TT'hat is a "District"?
Webster's New I nh•rnational Dictionary, second
edition, unabridged, published by G. & C. Merriam Company, definPf-1 a •'district" as:
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"1. The territory under a feudal lord's jurisdirtion. Obs.

"2. A division of territory; a defined portion of
a state, county, country, town, or city, etc.,
1nade for administrative, electoral, or other
purposes; as, a Congressional, federal, judicial, land, 1nilitis, magisterial, or school
district.

"* * *
"4. Loosely, any portion of frrritory; rr.qwn,
tract. (Italics oius)

In Words and Phra~Ps, Vol. 13, permanent
page 33, we find this:

~clition,

"Webster defines the word 'distriet' as a defined
portion of the state, and it is so used in the definition of a 'town' as a 'district of certain limits.'
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Town .of Oconto, 6
N.W. 607, 50 "\Vis. 189, 36 Am. Rep. 849."
(Italics ours.)
See numerous other illustrations of the definition
of the word "district" in:
Words & Phrases, Vol. 13, permanent edition,
pages 28 to and including 38.
In the case of English v. Smith, 196 A. 781, the
Supreme Court of Error~ of Connecticut, in 1938, distinguishes a Board ·of Sewer Commissioners of the
Town of Milford (held to be employees of the Town)
from a "commission of a sewer district organized for
1nunicipal purposes," saying ( p. 783) :
"the complaint, properly construed, shows
that the commission was, and remained, both
under the special act and the public act, ~· * * an
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official board, instrumentality, and agency of the
town of Milford, and not of a 'seu·wr district' in.
the sense of a distinct m1.tnicipality.'' (ItalicR
ours.)
In the case of Tygesen v. :Magna Water Works Co.,
Supra, this Court defines a sewer improvement district
in the following language (p. 131):
"Since an improvement district created under
Chap. 24, Laws of Utah 1949 is not a corporation
but is a separate arm of the government formed
for p1tblic p1trposes, it does not violate Sec. 5 of
Art. XI of the Utah State Constitution forbidding
the creation of corporations for municipal pnrposes, hy special law~." (Itaim~ ours.)
Distrirt mw of ''Area''.
(~onsistent with the definition of a di~trict, the legislahue of the State of Utah, in the enacbnent of the
Rtatutes under 'vhich the Central Weber Sewer Improvement District was created (Chapter 24, Laws of Utah,
1949, p. 43, et seq., as amended hy Chapter 32, Laws of
Ftah, 1951, p. 7~, et seq.) defined the area of such districts, fixed the Inethod for establishing the boundaries
of the districts, and designated the "]Jroperty" to be included therein or excluded therefrom as ''real property".

'ehe 1951 enactment ( ( )hapter 32, Laws of Utah,
1951) uses the single word "property" in the title to the
act in ~u(·h a manner that there can he no question but
that it means real propert~, onl~', because objections can
he made only hy "rPal property" owners, and yet those
real property owners were designated hy the single word
"property" ownPrR in that title. We flUOte:
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"An Act An1ending Section 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 11,
Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, Enabling Impovement Districts to Include Incorporated :Municipalities and Areas, Providing for Objections hy More
Than Twenty-five Per Cent in Number of Property Owners, for Appointment of Board of Trustees for Sewer Districts Including a Combination
of Two or More :Municipalities or Other Areas,
Ti1ne Limit for ::\Iaturity of Bonds, and for the
Powers of Improvement District." (Italics ours.)
In analyzing the entire legislation on this subject
it is apparent that the real intent of the legislature all
the way through was to establish sewer districts as a
''defined portion of the state", with geographical boundaries, encmnpassing, like a municipality, certain defined
areas .

.Area.
In quoting the title to the 1951 act, supra, we italicized the word "area" as well as the word "property".
In addition to that use of the word "area (which in and
of itself would see1n to define a sewer district by "area"
only) attention is called to the fact that all through the
legislation the word "area" or its equivalent is used, and
nowhere in the legiEilation do we observe the words
"personal property" used.
For illustration, we quote from Section 1 of the 1951
law (Chapter 32~ Laws of Utah, 1951):
"Section 1. Improveme~t District-Area of.
" * * * * * * *
"The area of any district created hereunder may
include all or part of any county or counties including all or any part of any incorporated munic-
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ipalities, other incorporated areas, and unincorporated areas, as the needs of the inhabitants
of the proposed districts may appear. Districts
of the same kind :-;hall not overlap." (Italics ours.)
Section 2 of the same statute, not only uses the word
"area" or ''area~" hut say~ that the resolution creating
the district shall :

"define the boundaries thereof * * *."
and goc>:-; on to speak of :
"25% or more of the owners of real property in
clu,ded within the proposed district * * * ."
and then speaks of ''part:·/' of other counties and areas in
the following language:
"In the event the proposed district includes any
part of another county or counties, the above
resolution shall further state the name or names
of the other rounty or counties and the areas
within such other county or counties proposed to
be incruded within such district." (Italics ours.)
Section 3 of that same statute provides for the notice of
intention to establish a proposed distrid:

''* * * which notice shall define the area to be included therein and the boundaries thereof, * * * "
(Italics ours.)
and goes on to provide that if:
"written protest shall be filed, signed by 1nore
than twenty-five percent (25%) in number of the
real property owners within said proposed district, according to the last assessment roll for
county taxes completed prior to the publishing
of the notice, the district ~hall not he established."
(Italics ours.)
Nowhere in the act is anything said about including
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personal property in the distrirt. In fact, the only thing
that is discussed in the act as being included is real pro]Jerty. Then when that smne statute goes on to ~ay what
shall be elim.inated under r~rtain specified conditions, in
the following language :
"In such resolution establishing such district, thr
board of County Commissioners shall eliminate
from said proposed district any property originally inclttded therein, but which it shall determine
will not be directly benefited hy the proposed improvements."
it can only 1nean what it ~ay~. that the property whirh
1night he PliminafPd, und~r the conditions specified, i~
any of the property which was ori.rtinally included in the
proposed distrirt. And the only property which was included in the proposed distrirt was real ]Jroperty; and
hence nothing but real property could he eliminated from
the district or could have been Pliminatrd from the proposed district in the first instance on the protest of the
respondents.
This is emphasized hy tlw following language from
that same Section 3 :
"Any property owner who shall have filed a
written protest, as hereinbefore provided, and
whose ]Jroperty has been included, notwithstanding such protest, may within ( 30) thirty days
after the adoption of the resolution establishing
such district, apply to the district court of the
judicial district in which such county is located
for a writ of review of the actions of the Board of
County Commissioners in so establishing such
district, but only upon the ground that his property will not be directly benefited by the proposed
improvements ... " (Italics ours.)
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In that language the ~ingle word "property" could only
refer to real property, because only real property
was included in the district. And, as elsewhere in this
brief argued, the provision with respect to direct benefit
refers only to real property within the district which
lies in such a position that a sewage system could carry
away the enstomary waste products.
Elsewhere in the legislation similar references and
usages of terms are found, all, in our opinion, referring
to real property and real property only.
A contrary view results in absurdities. A sewage
district, organized and bounded as provided by these
statutes, being a defined portion of the State, encmnpasses and includes everything within the confines of its
boundaries. And once established and bounded it becomes fixed, and everything in it is taxable in like manner to the general taxation of property in any other
defined portion of the state. To say that personal
property within the district is not within the district
is certainly an anomaly of rare complexion.
a

~rl

IU·

Differently put, it occurs to us that what respondents
are contending for in this case is not that their personal
property is not within or a part of the district, hut that
it should not be taxahle hy the district. There is a tremendous difference. Respondents have endeavored to
get certain of their properties excluded from taxation
when they should, perhaps, have heen endeavoring to get
certain of their real property excluded from the district.
Provision is mane in the law for getting real property
eliminated from the district. But we find no provision
for getting personal or other property eliminated (or
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. excluded) fron1 taxation, when and if it is within tlw
district.
We contend that respondents, having left all their
real property in the district hy failing to take the proper
steps to get it excluded hy delineation of area or boundary from the district itself, still seek to get certain of
that real and personal property excluded frmn taxation
while still ad1nitting that it is within the district. Or, in
answer to this statmnent, they may say that they want
the court to exclude it frmn the district hy decree, placing
it in a state of some type of suspended animation or
lifting it up above the district and there suspending it,
free frmn taxation. \Ve submit that this cannot be done.
Their properties are within the boundaries of the district, and that being so, they must be taxed generally as
all other properties are taxed. No legislative, judicial,
tax commision, or other recognized classification exists
for freeing properties lying within a sewer district from
taxation by the district. Plaintiffs' remedy, if any, was
to have the boundaries of the district so fixed (after
proper protest to that effect) that those boundaries did
not include their properties, if any. not directly benefitted by the sewer district.

General Taxation; not special assessment:
On the question of taxation, the distinction between
general and special in1provement taxes n1ust be made, inasmuch as the benefits which are the basis of special
assessments have no place in the consideration of a
general tax. The taxes imposed hy the Sewer Improvement District are general taxes.
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In Tygesen vs. ~Iagna vVater vVorks Co., supra, at
page 132, this court said:
"At the outset it should be kept in mind that
this act was enacted to provide for the creation of
Improvement Districts wherever desired in the
State, and that these Districts, when formed, are
quasi-municipalities, and the benefits to be obtained from such Districts enure to the public
generally. There are no provisions in the act for
special assessments or liabilities of individuals
for benefits which would enure to them as such,
but merely as members of the public. The taxes
which the Act empowers the District to levy for
the payment of the benefits are general taxes, and
not special assesments."
v~.

This distinction is like\\·i~e pointed out in Lehi
-:\Ieiling, 48 P. 2d ;)~7:

Cit~·

"The supplying of water for domestic uses
within municipalities has grown of recent years
to be one of the most common and well-recognized
forms of municipal activities wherein public property is employed and wherein public taxation is
imposed and collected upon the inhabitants of the
municipalities regardless of the benefits conferred
upon particular property, and by the same method
by which taxes are generally levied and collected
for the carrying on of the governmental functions
of incorporated cities and towns ...
" ... Nor can we discover any rational theory
upon which, in the levy and collection of such
taxes, the powers of either shaH be limited hy
those rules which have been given application in
the formation of that class of public agencies
wherein the assessments imposed upon a particular property have such direct reference to
37
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benefits conferred as to require notice and opportunity for hearing to be given to the owners of
the property to he affected by the a~~<'~smenh;
thus to he in1posed ... " (Italics ours.)
As pointed out hy Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 1, 4th
Edition, page 214:
"Taxes proper, or general taxes, it has heen
said 'proceed upon the theory that the existenr<'
of government is a necessity; that it cannot continue without means to pay its expenses; that for
those means it has the right to cmnpel all ritizens
and propert~· within it~ limits to contribute; and
that for such contribution, it renders no return
of special benefit to any property, hut only secure~
to the citizen that general benefit which result~
frmn protection to his person and property, and
the promotion of those various schemes whic·h
have for their object the welfare of all.' That
this is the correct theory is beyond douht, hut
nevertheless the contention has often been presented that property receiving no direct benefit
from a tax for a particular purpose should not he
taxed for such purpose. However, it is almost unanimously held that it is no defense to the collection of a tax for a special purpose that a person
liable for the tax is not benefited hy the expenditure of the proceeds of the tax or not as much
benefited as others. For instanre, every citizen
is bound to P•lY his portion of a school tax although he has no children, or is not a resident,
and this also applies to corporations; of a police
or fire tax, although he has no buildings or
personal property; or of a road tax although he
never used the road. In other tcords, a general
tax cannot be dissected to show that, as to certain
constifupnf parts. the taxpayPr recei1.·ps n.o benP38
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fits. So property within the lin1it~ of a Jnunicipality is subject to local taxation although it
derives little or no benefit from the municipal
government. This rule is often applied to the
taxation for special purposes of agricultural lands
situated within the corporate limits of cities. If
such property was exempted, the provision of the
constitution requiring taxes to be eq~tal and
uniform would be violated." (Italics ours.)

It has bePn stipulated by the appellants and respondents that there is a general benefit to all persons situated
within the boundaries of the District.

In the case of _Morton Salt Company vs. City of
South Hutchinson, 159 F. 2d 897 the rrenth Circuit Court
of Appeals discussed a situation in which the plaintiff
complained that the water works proposed terminated
three-quarters of a mile from the plaintiff's property,
and that they should he freed from the tax_. In that case,
it did not appear that the Supreme Court of Kansas had
declared the tax from which the plaintiff sought to be
excluded, a general tax, hut the Fedeal Court pointed
out at page 900 that:
''It is no constitutional defense to a tax that
the taxpayer is not directly benefited thereby, or
is less benefited than others who pay the same or
less tax ... "
rrhe Federal Court in that case cited Cooley, from
whom we have just quoted, and said further, at page 901:
''The authorities sometimes draw a distinction between a general ad valorpm tax levied for
the general welfare of the whole community, and
a tax in the form of an assessment to finance
speeial improvements designed to benefit tlH•
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property located within a particular taxing jnriRdiction."
The sa1ne court at page 902 said :
"We may take judicial notice, even in the face
of the complaint, that the proposed waterworkR
system would redound to the benefit of the whole
community, in virtue of its contribution to the
health, safety~ morals, and general welfare thereof, and that all of the property and people included within the City would be either directly or
indirectly benefited thereby." (Italics ours.)
Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 1. 4th Edition, page 648,
statPf':
"In case of specially created taxing districts,
the same rule prevails. If the boundaries are designated l)y the legislature, such designation is
final and cannot be reviewed hy the rourts unless
in exceptional cases. One whose property is within
the boundaries of the district cannot attack the
tax on the ground that his property is not benefited by the tax and should not have heen included within the taxing district."
Since the tax i1nposed is a general one, where the
receipt of benefits is not a factor, the only method of
escaping the tax is through an area exclusion. This
Inethod is effective, because at the inception the district
had only provisional houndaries from which the County
Commissioners were obligated to exclude the property
not directly benefited. Once the boundaries of the district had been established, all property included within
the limits of the district were subject to the general tax,
and the respondents' failing to request an area exclusion,
and their failing to make a record upon which the County
Commissioners rould make an area exclusion, they Inust
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be subject to the general tax, whether or not they are
directly benefited by the proposed improvements.
The :Morton Salt decision, last above cited, expressly
holds that any tax levied and imposed for the purpose
of supplying capital for municipalities or quasi-municipalities is not to he regarded as a special tax or assessment but is a general tax levied just as, and for the same
purpose, that any general municipal tax is imposed, for
carrying on the governmental functions or utilitarian
objects of any duly incorporated cities or towns.

Point 2: REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS' 1fOrriON TO STRIKE.
Reference is made to paragraph .J. of the stipulation
of facts on file applicable to all of the pending cases.
lt is therein stated that the word "directly" was added
to the law for the fir~t time in 1951. While appellants
contend that the addition of the word "directly'' neither
adds to nor detracts from the overall meaning of the
law as it relates to a general tax, yet it is interesting to
trace the statutory enaetments from the very beginning
to the present time.
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 10..J:7, Section 3, passed
:.\[arch 13, 1947, and in effect May 13, 1947, provided in
part as follows :
"At such tin1e the Board of County Commissioners shall hear the petitioner and all protests and
objections to the same ... On the final hearing
the Board of County Commissioners shall make
such changes in the proposed boundaries as may
be deemed advisable, and shall define and establish such boundaries ... " (Italics ours.)
No reference was made to any exelusion of property.
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Chapter 24, Law~ of Utah, 1949, passed l\[arrh 8,
1949, and in effect ~lay 18, 1949, repealed Chapter 25,
Laws of Utah, 1947. Section 3 of that art provided as
follows, in part:
"In such resolution establishing such district, the
Board of County Commissioners shall ~liminatr
from said proposed district any property originally included therein, but which it shall determine
will not be benef#ed hy the proposed improvements ... " (Italics ours.)
The law under which the Central Weber Sew~r
Improvement District wa~ organized is Chapter 32, Laws
of Utah, 1951, passed February 13, 1951, and became
effective May 8, 1951. Section 3 provided in part as
follows:
" . . . originally included therein, hut which it
shall determine will not be directly benefited .."
(Italics ours.)
The present law, Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1953,
(Section 17-6-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) passed
March 12, 1953, and in effect :March 24, 1953, provided in
part as follows :
'' . . . Originally included therein, but which it
shall determine will not be benefited by the ..."
(Italics ours)
What the legislature intended by adding the word
"directly" into the law in 1951 was to set up a formula
under which the owners of real property in an area
which could not be reached by the sewer system in the
sewer district, or which might be lower in altitude so
as to be impossible of drainage by a proposed sewer
system, could protest such of their real property areas
out of the boundaries of the proposed district. It evi42
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dently was then felt that it would be easier for an owner
to protest such portions of his property out of a proposed district if the act used the words "directly benefited" rather than the word "benefited." We urge that
for such purposes and for such purpose only, the word
"directly" has a meaning which is consistent with the
intent of the legislature. Otherwise it does violence to
the entire act, the provisions of which are not subject
to any other reasonable interpretation.
At this point, respondents Inight inquire as to why,
then, the legislature had deleted the word "directly" in
subsequent legislation. And we believe the answer is
that it recognized its error in changing the 1949 enactment by adding that word in the 1951 legislation, and
deleted it in the 1953 legislation, because it was unnecessary to have the word "directly" preceding the word
"benefited" if the area sought to be protested out could
not in fact be benefited because of its physical position
beyond or belo\v the drainage of the proposed sewer
:-;ystem.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we submit that in each of the aboveentitled actions the judgments of the lower Court should
be reversed, and the complaints and petitions of the
several plaintiffs for review should be denied; and we
submit that the action of the Board of County Commissioners of Weber County in including all of the propP,rty involved in these cases within the District, should
1e upheld and affir1ned.
Respectfully submitted,
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON
Attorneys for Appellants
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